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Globally, states use state-owned companies (SOCs) or public corporations 
to provide public goods, limit private and foreign control of the domestic 
economy, generate public funds for the fiscus, increase service delivery and 
encourage economic development and industrialisation. Particularly given 
its unique socio-political and economic dynamics, a country such as South 
Africa clearly needs this type of strategic enterprise. Yet, that does not mean 
that everything at our SOCs is as it should be. The beleaguered South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) has recently seen the resignation 
of board members, shareholder interference in its operational affairs, and a 
high turnover of chief accounting officers and other executive management 
members. Due to non-performance, it has also received several cash 
injections from its shareholder to enable it to continue to deliver its services. 
In addition, the shareholder minister took it upon herself to amend the 
SABC's memorandum of incorporation, conferring upon herself the authority 
to appoint, suspend or even dismiss key executive members. South African 
Airways (SAA), in turn, has had seven CEOs in less than four years, has 
had to be bailed out at a cost of R550 million, and has in addition been 
granted a R5 billion guarantee by the shareholder for a restructuring 
exercise. Other SOCs such as Eskom, the Post Office and Telkom have 
also experienced high board and executive management turnover, 
perennial underperformance necessitating regular bailouts, and challenges 
regarding the division of power between their boards and the various 
shareholder ministers. Another issue that seems to plague South Africa's 
SOCs is the appointment of board members and executive officials with 
questionable qualifications. By critically examining the corporate 
governance challenges besetting the SABC, SAA and Eskom in particular, 
this article seeks to explore the root causes of the corporate governance 
deficiencies of SOCs, and how their corporate governance can be 
enhanced. It is concluded that the challenges faced by the country's SOCs 
are twofold: firstly, the SOCs boards' lack of appreciation of the cardinal 
corporate governance rules, and secondly, the role of government as a 
single or dominant shareholder, which results in substantial political 
interference in the running of the SOCs. This dual problem requires a dual 
solution. To arrest the problem of poor corporate governance in SOCs, 
government as the shareholder should firstly appoint fit and proper directors, 
having followed a sound due-diligence process. Once it has established 
such properly skilled and competent boards, however, government should 
adopt an arm's-length approach to the affairs of the SOCs as a way of 
insulating these corporations from political interference. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2014, the office of the South African Public Protector in a published report 
found developments at the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC), a state-owned company, to be "symptomatic of pathological 
corporate governance deficiencies".1 In addition, the Public Protector found 
that the SABC board had failed "to provide strategic oversight to the national 
broadcaster as provided for in the SABC Board Charter and King III 
Report".2 
Of course, failure of corporate governance is in no way unique to the SABC. 
Within the South African context, other examples where failed corporate 
governance has led to reduced shareholder value or even the total collapse 
of companies include Masterbond, CNA, Unifer, Tollgate and Leisurenet.3 
This contribution, however, will focus specifically on corporate governance 
at the country's state-owned companies (SOCs), for a few reasons. Firstly, 
SOCs play a significant part in the growth, development and stability of the 
South African economy, with key SOCs being the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa, South African Airways (SAA), Eskom, Telkom and 
Transnet.4 Secondly, good corporate governance in SOCs also serves to 
incentivise other companies to embrace corporate governance principles, 
which may ultimately see an improvement in the country's global market 
power and ability to attract foreign investment.5 Thirdly, SOCs generally 
provide basic services to society, which means that in most instances the 
                                            
*  Tebello Thabane. BA Law LLB (Lesotho) LLM (Pretoria) LLM (Free State). Lecturer 
in Commercial Law, University of Cape Town, PhD Candidate (UCT), South Africa. 
Email: tebello.thabane@uct.ac.za. 
**  Elizabeth Snyman-Van Deventer. BIuris LLB LLM LLM LLD (Free State). Professor 
in Mercantile Law, University of the Free State, South Africa. Email: 
snymane@ufs.ac.za. 
1  Office of the Public Protector 2014 http://www.pprotect.org/sites/default/files/ 
Legislation_report/SABC%20FINAL%20REPORT%2017%20FEBRUARY%202014
.pdf 20. 
2  Office of the Public Protector 2014 http://www.pprotect.org/sites/default/files/ 
Legislation_report/SABC%20FINAL%20REPORT%2017%20FEBRUARY%202014
.pdf 21. 
3  Ahunwan Globalisation and Corporate Governance 13; Nancy et al Enron and other 
Corporate Fiascos.  
4  Others include Denel, Airports Company South Africa, the Public Investment 
Corporation, the Government Employees Medical Scheme, the Government 
Employees Pension Fund and the SA Post Office. 
5  Makuta 2009 Malawi LJ 55, 60. 
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very fabric of our lives depends on whether or not these companies are 
successfully governed.6 
Following the inception of democracy, the new South African government 
was faced with the problem of having inherited many underperforming 
SOCs from the previous dispensation, some of which the Mandela 
administration subsequently tried to "offload" through privatisation.7 Today, 
there are several opposing views regarding the country's SOCs. There are 
those who call for the privatisation of non-performing SOCs; others argue 
that South Africa cannot become a fully developed state without strategic 
government intervention in the economy; while some continue to seek the 
nationalisation of all strategically important companies to assist the poor. 
Calls to privatise some SOCs due to their poor governance and non-
performance are particularly prevalent in the media.8 These conflicting 
opinions even culminated in a study commissioned by the president to 
investigate the role of SOCs in a developmental state.9 
1.1  Defining corporate governance in the SOC setting 
Although no standard definition of corporate governance exists, the United 
Kingdom's so-called Cadbury Report and the first King Report10 both view 
corporate governance as "the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled". However, as this Cadbury/King definition has been criticised for 
being deceptively simple and lacking nuance,11 this article uses the more 
comprehensive and nuanced definition offered by Du Plessis and 
colleagues, who regard corporate governance as: 
… the process of controlling management and of balancing the interests of all 
internal stakeholders and other parties who can be affected by the 
corporation's conduct in order to ensure responsible behaviour by 
corporations and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability 
for a corporation.12 
In the SOC setting, therefore, corporate governance refers to the process 
of governing SOCs with the same sound corporate controls and 
management as other, profit-seeking companies, even though SOCs may 
                                            
6  McGregor 2015 The Thinker 67. 
7  Afeikhena "Privatisation and Regulation in SA". 
8  Afeikhena "Privatisation and Regulation in SA". 
9  PRC 2010 The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Developmental State (on file 
with the authors).  
10  Cadbury Report of Committee on Financial Aspects para 2.5; IoDSA King Report I. 
11  Jordan Cadbury Twenty Years On 6. 
12  Du Plessis, Hargovan and Bagaric Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance 6-7. 
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have social or public goals that profit-seeking companies potentially do not. 
SOCs must be actively owned and managed so as to achieve their stated 
objectives in an efficient, effective and socially responsible way, while also 
ensuring that they fulfil their social responsibilities to government as a 
shareholder, other stakeholders, and the country's citizens generally.13 
1.2  Setting the scene: How are our SOCs? 
Studies14 reveal that states worldwide use SOCs, or public corporations, for 
many strategic reasons, inter alia to provide "public" as opposed to "private" 
goods. Governments may also run public corporations to improve labour 
relations in strategic economic sectors, limit private and foreign control of 
the domestic economy, generate public funds for the fiscus, increase 
service delivery, and encourage economic development and 
industrialisation.15 Clearly, therefore, a country such as South Africa needs 
this type of strategic enterprise, particularly given its unique socio-political 
and economic dynamics characterised by a legacy of societal segregation. 
So, despite renewed calls for the privatisation of SOCs in South Africa, 
these corporations are likely to, and indeed must, remain under state 
ownership for the foreseeable future. Yet that does not mean that everything 
at our SOCs is as it should be. 
The SABC, for instance, has recently seen the resignation of board 
members, inter alia due to shareholder or, to be more precise, ministerial 
interference in its operational affairs, which led to a board/shareholder 
fallout. The corporation has had a high turnover of chief accounting officers 
and other executive management members. Due to non-performance, it has 
also received several cash injections from its shareholder to continue to 
deliver its services. In its 2014/15 financial statements the SABC reported a 
loss of approximately R395 million; at the same time, however, its embattled 
chief operating officer's salary increased from R2,8 million to R3,7 million.16 
Poor corporate governance at the SABC is also evident in the amendment 
of the memorandum of incorporation by the minister, as shareholder, 
conferring upon herself the authority to appoint, suspend or even dismiss 
the chief executive officer (CEO), chief operating officer (COO) and chief 
                                            
13  PwC 2015 https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/assets/pwc-state-owned-
enterprise-psrc.pdf 42. 
14  OECD OECD Comparative Report; World Bank Held by the Visible Hand. 
15  PwC 2015 https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/assets/pwc-state-owned-
enterprise-psrc.pdf 4. 
16  SABC 2015 http://www.sabc.co.za/sabc/annual-reports. 
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finance officer (CFO).17 This raises questions about the division of power 
between the SABC board and shareholder.18 
South African Airways (SAA), in turn, has had seven CEOs in less than four 
years.19 In the same period the corporation received a bailout of R550 million 
to cover fuel costs and has been granted a R5 billion guarantee by the 
shareholder for a restructuring exercise. This proves that the state-owned 
carrier is neither managed nor owned appropriately, running at a huge loss 
that costs taxpayers dearly. 
Other SOCs such as Eskom, the Post Office and Telkom have also 
experienced high board and executive management turnover, perennial 
underperformance necessitating regular bailouts, and challenges regarding 
the division of power between their boards and the various shareholder 
ministers. Most of these boards fail to function in accordance with the 
requirements of the Companies Act.20 This appears from the warning by the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) issued to the 
boards of five SOCs that they are running the risk of being declared 
delinquent or being placed under probation in terms of section 162 of the 
Companies Act for failing to adhere to the concerns that the Auditor-General 
raised in their respective annual financial reports.21  
Another issue that seems to plague South Africa's SOCs is controversy 
surrounding the appointment of board members and executive officials with 
questionable qualifications. For good governance, board members and 
executive managers or officials must have the qualifications, experience 
and integrity to lead SOCs. If they do not, this casts doubt on the reasons 
for their appointment by the shareholder ministers and boards respectively.  
As corporate governance in many SOCs is seemingly suspect, this article 
seeks to explore the root causes of these corporate governance 
deficiencies, the specific governance challenges involved, and how 
corporate governance can be enhanced. To this end, once the theoretical 
                                            
17  Gqirana 2015 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sabc-take-over-
unconstitutional-da-20151206. 
18  Section 66 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 gives the board authority to run the 
corporation, including appointing executive managers, while s 68 gives shareholders 
the power to appoint the board, but not managers. 
19  Hill and Bowker 2015 https://www.biznews.com/sa-investing/2015/11/18/poisoned-
chalice-saa-gets-7th-ceo-in-4yrs-hr-turnaround-not-strategy/. 
20  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
21  CIPC 2014 http://www.cipc.co.za/files/6514/1933/0901/Media_Statement 
_2_of_2014.pdf. 
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and legislative framework pertaining to SOCs has been established, the 
article critically examines the specific corporate governance challenges 
besetting a selection of South African SOCs, namely the SABC, SAA and 
Eskom. The fact that these SOCs have different shareholder ministries22 
offers a good basis for comparison of how the role of the shareholder in 
particular affects corporate governance at these entities. 
2 Anchoring corporate governance of SOCs in a 
theoretical and legislative framework 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
In general, corporate governance may be understood in terms of five 
theories, namely the agency theory, the stewardship theory, the enlightened 
shareholder theory, the new corporate governance theory and Wong's three 
pillars of SOC reform. In order to understand the peculiar agency problems 
inflicted on SOCs by both boards and shareholder ministers, who are not 
the SOC owners and whose vigilance in directing and overseeing SOCs is 
thus often questionable, a relevant theory would be the agency theory, 
supplemented with elements from Wong's theory for SOC reform. Given the 
nature of SOCs, being public corporations with public funding and a myriad 
of stakeholders, the stewardship theory may also shed more light on how 
the relationship between these many stakeholders affects corporate 
governance at the selected SOCs.  
2.1.1 Agency theory, supplemented with Wong's three pillars of SOC 
reform  
The agency problem has been aptly encapsulated as follows:  
The directors of companies, being managers of other people's money, cannot 
be expected to watch over it with the same vigilance with which they watch 
over their own.23  
At the heart of the agency problem, therefore, is the self-serving or self-
seeking nature of human beings.24 In corporate governance, the agency 
dilemma arises where the governance relationship between the 
shareholders (the principals) and the directors (the agents) is such that the 
latter seek to maximise their own personal benefit through actions beneficial 
                                            
22  Communications, Treasury and Public Enterprises respectively. 
23  Smith in Tricker Corporate Governance 58. 
24  Chang State-Owned Enterprises Reform 14. 
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to themselves, but detrimental to the shareholders.25 This is even more 
pronounced when there is a separation of ownership and control, with 
management developing a tendency to act in this self-serving manner 
because it receives only a tiny fraction of the profits generated by its 
activities, rarely owning a substantial number of shares in such companies.  
Since SOCs are run by directors and managers who do not and, by 
definition, cannot own the corporations, as they are owned by the state and, 
therefore, the citizenry, agency problems may be acute due to this 
divergence of interests. In fact, in SOCs, agency has two layers: the 
directors who serve on behalf of the shareholder, and the shareholder who 
represents the actual owners, namely the public. Therefore, in the same 
way that the directors cannot be expected to watch over the SOC's interests 
as vigilantly as they would watch over their own, the shareholder minister 
may also lack the required vigilance.26 This problem of "double agency" 
unique to SOCs implies that corporate governance issues in these 
corporations centre on both agency costs and political costs. This, then, 
overlaps and ties in with Wong's three pillars for SOC reform, namely 
political interference, a lack of clear mandates and a lack of transparency.27 
Clearly, therefore, any assessment of corporate governance in SOCs 
should address those areas where agency costs, political costs 
(interference/meddling), a lack of transparency or a lack of clear mandates 
may have an influence. These would include the appointment and 
composition of boards, board compensation and executive remuneration, 
board authority in relation to the shareholder, the division and delegation of 
power within SOCs, ethics and integrity, the multifaceted role of government 
as the shareholder, regulator, financier and customer, and its impact on 
corporate governance, and, finally, the ownership model of SOCs, and its 
impact on corporate governance. 
The agency problem may in turn lead to the free rider problem, which 
confronts SOCs in a unique way. Citizens, it is argued, do not have the 
means or incentive to monitor the shareholder minister and directors' 
performance; they lack the information and institutional capacity to negotiate 
management's employment or to monitor and control management's 
                                            
25  Chang State-Owned Enterprises Reform 14. 
26  Lin 2012 Asian Bus Law 115-135, which comprehensively deals with the problems 
of agency facing China's SOEs; Chiu and Lewis Reforming China's State-Owned 
Enterprises 140; Menozzi and Gutiérrez 2008 https://www.webssa.net/files/ 
Gutierrez-Menozzi_Board_composition_in_SOEs.pdf. 
27  Wong 2004 Corp Gov 6. 
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activities.28 Judging by the corporate governance challenges facing South 
Africa's SOCs, there seems to be some credence to the free rider argument. 
However, since shareholder ministers and boards account for SOCs' 
performance before parliament, which represents the public, it cannot be 
argued that there is no public monitoring. Probably closer to the truth is that 
parliament lacks effectiveness in monitoring the SOCs. A thorough 
assessment of the sufficiency of the present arrangement of ownership and 
control of SOCs through various ministries and the role of parliament may 
therefore prove useful. 
2.1.2  Stewardship theory 
It is true, however, that the underpinning assumptions of the agency theory 
may not apply to all directors and at all times,29 and in effect ignore the 
complexities associated with running companies – hence the need for the 
stewardship theory. Unlike the agency theory, the stewardship theory 
largely views governance from the legal perspective of the corporation. Put 
simply, upon incorporation a company becomes a separate legal entity, 
distinct from its shareholders. The shareholders appoint directors to run the 
company and act as stewards for shareholder interests. The directors' 
report to shareholders on the results of their stewardship is usually 
accompanied by an independent auditor's report verifying the company's 
financial health.30 Stewardship is also grounded in the many duties that 
directors owe to the company and, by extension, the shareholders, such as 
fiduciary duties and the duty to exercise care, skill and diligence, which are 
now entrenched in the Companies Act.31 Thus, there is an inherent belief 
that the directors will not conduct the corporation's affairs in a self-serving 
manner and can be trusted to operate the business in shareholders' 
interest.32  
The stewardship theory has come under heavy criticism in recent times, 
however, with the trust owing by directors having been eroded by corporate 
scandals involving risky trading, obscene directors' remuneration, non-
disclosure and general manipulation of company books to reflect non-
existent profits.33 This underlines the need for corporate governance 
principles to guide boards' operations. In the SOC context, shareholder 
                                            
28  Victor 1985 Colum L Rev 1403-1444. 
29  Tricker Corporate Governance 65. 
30  Tricker Corporate Governance 65. 
31  Section 76 of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
32  Donaldson and Davis 1991 Aust J Manag 49-64. 
33  Tricker Corporate Governance 66. 
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ministers must be very vigilant to ensure that boards act in the interest of 
the company and are true stewards of the state's interests. 
2.2  Legislative framework 
SOCs are legal creatures. They fall squarely within the ambit of the 
Companies Act,34 and being state-owned, they are also run subject to the 
dictates of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA).35 In addition, SOCs 
have their own founding legislation that determines their specific public 
mandates. Being companies in their own right, they also have to implement 
the recommendations of King III.36 Finally, as public-sector corporations they 
are expected to implement the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the 
Public Sector.37 The following paragraphs briefly explore some of the key 
corporate governance issues addressed in this legislative framework, 
including the centrality of the board in governance issues, the division of 
power among corporate organs, the delegation of power by the board to the 
executive management, the board's appointment and composition, the 
board's accountability, the standards of directors' conduct, and conflict of 
interest.38  
2.2.1  The 2008 Companies Act 
In terms of the Companies Act, an SOC must have a board, which is 
charged with the primary responsibility of exercising all the powers and 
performing any of the functions of the SOC, except where limited by the Act 
itself or the memorandum of incorporation.39 This is an important provision, 
considering the political meddling sometimes experienced by the boards of 
SOCs from their shareholder ministers, with a case in point being the 
communications minister who sought to arrogate the power to appoint, 
suspend and dismiss key officers of the SABC.40 An SOC board should 
                                            
34  Companies Act 71 of 2008, as amended by the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 
2011, read with the Companies Regulations, 2011 (GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26 Aril 
2011). 
35  Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (the PFMA). 
36  IoDSA King Report III. 
37  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance. 
38  For a comprehensive comparison of the PFMA, Companies Act and King III, see 
PwC 2012 https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/companies-act-steering-point-
4.pdf. 
39  Section 66(1)(2) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
40  Gqirana 2015 Gqirana 2015 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sabc-take-
over-unconstitutional-da-20151206. 
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consist of at least three directors and must establish a social and ethics 
committee.41 
SOC directors must act in good faith and for proper purpose. They must 
also act in the best interest of the SOC, and with the degree of care, skill 
and diligence that may reasonably be expected of similarly situated and able 
persons.42 The obligations of acting in the best interest of the SOC and of 
care, skill and diligence are considered discharged when a director takes 
reasonable, diligent steps to familiarise him/herself with a matter, has no 
material personal interest in any matter under deliberation, and makes 
rational decisions.43 Given the laxity displayed by some SOC directors in the 
recent past, it is arguable whether these crucial provisions are observed.44 
2.2.2  The Public Finance Management Act 
The PFMA establishes the accountability of the SOC board and requires 
directors to exercise the duty of utmost care so as to ensure reasonable 
protection of the SOC's assets and records. To this end, the directors must 
act with fidelity, honesty, integrity and in the best interest of the SOC in 
managing its financial affairs, and must on request disclose to the minister 
responsible for that SOC, or to the legislature to which the SOC is 
accountable, all material facts, including those reasonably discoverable, 
which may in any way influence the minister's or legislature's decisions or 
actions. Furthermore, directors must, within the board's sphere of influence, 
seek to prevent any prejudice to the SOC's financial interests.45 
Yet, despite this elaborate exposition of the duties of SOC directors to 
diligently manage SOC finances and disclose the necessary information to 
the minister shareholder and the legislature, recklessness in the financial 
management of SOCs such as SAA, Eskom and the SABC is rife to such 
an extent that they have frequently to be bailed out by the state.  
In terms of section 50(2) of the PFMA, an SOC director may not act in a way 
that is inconsistent with the responsibilities assigned to the board, or use 
the position or privileges of, or confidential information obtained as, a 
                                            
41  Section 72(4) of Companies Act 71 of 2008, read with Reg 43 of the Companies 
Regulations, 2011. 
42  Section 76 of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
43  Sections 76(3)(b) and (c) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
44  CIPC 2014 http://www.cipc.co.za/files/6514/1933/0901/Media_Statement_2_of 
_2014.pdf. The CPIC threatened to apply for an order declaring the boards of some 
SOCs delinquent for failure to comply with the Auditor-General's directions. 
45  Section 49 read with s 50 of the PFMA. 
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director for personal gain or to improperly benefit another person. To curb 
the abuse or misuse of information, SOC directors must disclose their 
interests to the board, whether direct or indirect, and withdraw from board 
proceedings when any matter in which they have such interest is 
considered, unless the board decides that the member's direct or indirect 
interest in the matter is inconsequential or irrelevant.46  
Section 51 requires the SOC board to maintain effective, efficient and 
transparent systems of financial and risk management as well as internal 
control; an internal audit system under the control and direction of an audit 
committee that complies with and operates in accordance with the Treasury 
regulations and the PFMA itself, and an appropriate procurement and 
provisioning system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-
effective. 
However, notwithstanding these clear provisions of the PFMA, some SOCs' 
directors have been implicated in meddling in the awarding of lucrative 
tenders.47 Arguably, therefore, PFMA compliance in some SOCs is 
questionable.  
2.2.3  Founding legislation of SOCs 
SOCs owe their existence to their founding legislation, which typically 
provides for their establishment, control, powers, functions and funding. The 
founding legislation is entity-specific.  
The SABC, for instance, is established by the Broadcasting Act.48 The 
objects of the Act include to establish and develop a broadcasting policy in 
South Africa in the public interest and, for that purpose, to establish a strong 
and committed public broadcasting service that will serve the needs of the 
South African society.49 Part 5 of the Act deals specifically with issues of 
governance of the SABC. It provides that the board shall consist of two 
executive directors and 12 non-executive directors appointed by the 
president on the National Assembly's advice. It also provides for the auditing 
of the SABC's financial books.  
SAA, in turn, used to be a subsidiary of Transnet. In 2007, however, it was 
independently established in terms of the SAA Act, which provided for the 
                                            
46  PwC 2012 https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/companies-act-steering-point-4.pdf 
8. 
47  Brümmer and Sole 2008 Mail & Guardian. 
48  Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999. 
49  Section 2 of the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999. 
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transfer of Transnet shares in SAA to the state, and the conversion of SAA 
into a public company having a share capital incorporated in terms of the 
Companies Act.50 Section 2(c) of the SAA Act provides for the listing of SAA 
as a major public entity in schedule 2 to the PFMA, thus bringing SAA within 
the ambit of the latter Act. Although the SAA Act does not contain specific 
governance provisions, the company is subject to the governance 
provisions in the PFMA, the Companies Act and King III. 
Similar to the SAA Act, Eskom's founding legislation – the Eskom 
Conversion Act – is not elaborate, stating as its main objective the 
conversion of Eskom from a statutory body into a public company, Eskom 
Holdings.51 In terms of the PFMA, the accounting authority of the corporation 
is its board of directors, which is largely responsible for mapping the 
strategic direction and leadership of the corporation and ensuring that 
corporate governance and ethics are observed. The principles of corporate 
governance applicable to Eskom are therefore not necessarily found in its 
founding legislation, but in the Companies Act, the PFMA, King III and the 
Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector collectively.  
2.2.4  King III 
In terms of King III, the board should act as the focal point for and custodian 
of corporate governance.52 It should comprise a balance of power, with a 
majority of non-executive directors, the majority of whom should be 
independent.53 Similar to the Companies Act and the PFMA, King III requires 
SOC directors to always act in the best interest of the company.54 
More specifically, King III directs SOC boards to appreciate that strategy, 
risk, performance and sustainability are inseparable; to provide effective 
leadership based on an ethical foundation; to ensure that the SOC is, and 
is seen to be, a responsible corporate citizen; to ensure that the SOC's 
ethics are managed effectively; to ensure that the SOC has an effective and 
independent audit committee, and to be responsible for the governance of 
risk.55 All these requirements are meant to bolster SOC governance and 
complement the provisions of the Companies Act and the PFMA. 
                                            
50  South African Airways Act 5 of 2007 (SAA Act). 
51  Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001. 
52  IoDSA King Report III Principle 2.1.  
53  IoDSA King Report III Principle 2.18. 
54  IoDSA King Report III Principle 2.14. 
55  IoDSA King Report III Principle 2.  
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The balance of power within the SOC board is vital. King III provides that 
the board itself should elect a chairman who is an independent non-
executive director. For obvious reasons, the CEO of the SOC may not 
double up as the chairman of the board.56 The board should also appoint 
the CEO and establish a framework for the delegation of authority.57 Yet in 
some SOCs, the shareholder minister appoints the CEO, which probably 
does not auger well for corporate governance. As will be argued later, 
evidence exists that where a shareholder minister appoints a CEO, the latter 
does not believe him/herself accountable to the board, but instead to the 
minister who made the appointment, which renders the board powerless 
against the executive management. Such a board will struggle to act as a 
custodian of corporate governance. 
2.3.5  Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector 
The Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector ("the Protocol") 
provides guidance to various public entities, including SOCs,58 taking into 
account SOCs' unique mandate, which includes the achievement of 
government's socio-politico-economic objectives. The Protocol was 
developed because of the realisation that the King Code, being of general 
application, does not cover governance issues specific to the public sector. 
However, the principles of the Protocol seek only to amplify and not to 
supersede (or contradict) those in the King Code, which is why the two 
should in fact be read together.59  
The Protocol recognises that SOCs face serious financial, reputational, 
political and operational risks,60 and consequently have to adhere to the 
highest standards of corporate governance. Similar to King III, the Protocol 
provides that an SOC board, being a fundamental basis of corporate 
governance, must effectively and efficiently control and head the 
corporation. To this end, the Protocol requires boards to comprise both 
executive and non-executive directors, with the latter being in the majority 
to safeguard independent and objective decision-making.61 
The Protocol goes on to state that the SOC board is charged with absolute 
responsibility for the SOC's performance, for which the board is fully 
                                            
56  IoDSA King Report III Principle 2.16. 
57  IoDSA King Report III Principle 2.17. 
58  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance; Koma 2009 J 
Publ Adm 451-459. 
59  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance para 2.2. 
60  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance para 2.3. 
61  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance para 5.1. 
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accountable to the shareholder.62 It also recommends that the board should 
appoint one of its members, preferably an independent non-executive 
director (unless otherwise agreed by the shareholder), as board 
chairperson.63  
Interestingly, the Protocol acknowledges that an SOC's performance 
depends on its board's capabilities and performance, and recommends that 
the shareholder should therefore ensure that the board is properly 
constituted with individuals who possess integrity and accountability, 
competence, relevant and complementary skills, experience and 
expertise.64 Despite this clear recommendation, media reports abound of 
SOC boards comprising some individuals of questionable integrity and 
character, who have been implicated in falsifying their qualifications and 
meddling in tenders. This raises questions as to the prudence with which 
the relevant shareholder ministers made those specific board appointments. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Protocol replicates the King Code in 
material respects, although its implementation is inadequate. 
3 A detailed assessment of the state of corporate 
governance in SAA, the SABC and Eskom 
Despite the well-established theoretical and legislative frameworks within 
which SOCs are understood and operated, the corporate governance 
challenges within many of these companies seem endless. This leads one 
to conclude that the problem may not necessarily be the frameworks,65 but 
instead their implementation. 
The poor state of corporate governance was recognised as far back as 
2002, when the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector was 
passed, yet the problem has remained unabated. Severe 
underperformance, frequent bailouts, high board and CEO turnovers and 
shareholder interference in board matters continue to characterise most of 
the country's SOCs. The National Assembly, the Presidency and many 
other stakeholders all agree that urgent improvement is needed. To this end 
the Presidency commissioned studies on SOC governance and ownership, 
and the National Assembly urged the Department of Public Enterprises to 
urgently table a bill addressing the governance of these companies. In 
seeking possible solutions, the following paragraphs explore the specific 
                                            
62  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance para 5.1.1.1. 
63  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance para 5.1.2.1. 
64  Department of Public Enterprises Protocol on Corporate Governance para 5.1.6.1. 
65  Lipton and Lorsch 1992 Bus Law 59-77.  
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corporate governance challenges confronting SAA, the SABC and Eskom, 
speculating on the reasons for the challenges, with the ultimate aim of 
making recommendations for improvement. 
3.1  South African Airways 
Of the government SOC portfolio, the national carrier, SAA, is arguably one 
of the worst underperformers. At one stage the corporation developed eight 
turnaround strategies within a period of six years but implemented none.66 
SAA has had seven CEOs within a period of four years.67 The corporation 
has also underperformed financially, necessitating a capital injection by the 
shareholder on numerous occasions.68 This, accompanied by board 
infighting, has often led to the shareholder firing the entire board.69 Scandals 
that faced SAA include tender irregularities implicating both executive 
managers and some board members, and board members and executive 
managers' bogus and/or lack of qualifications. Emanating from these issues 
are a number of corporate governance concerns: 
a) The fact that the qualifications ascribed to some board members are 
allegedly false or non-existent clearly shows that SAA board 
composition may be a problem. As the shareholder, the government 
has not taken care to appoint the best-qualified individuals to the 
board. Due diligence has not been followed to ensure that board 
members are fit and proper. King III and the Protocol on Corporate 
Governance in the Public Sector emphasise the need for a majority of 
independent directors. Granted, the majority of the members of the 
SOC boards, including SAA's, are "independent". Yet, due to the 
growing commercialisation of SOCs, directors must also have the 
qualifications, commercial experience and acumen to lead their 
corporations in a globally competitive environment – in SAA's case, 
the airline business. As some board members allegedly lack 
appropriate qualifications and commercial experience, it is thus 
tempting to argue that some SAA board members are political 
                                            
66  Landu 2013 Public Enterprises Committee Unhappy with SAA 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=2872.  
67  Landu 2013 Public Enterprises Committee Unhappy with SAA 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=2872. 
68  This was the subject of litigation in Comair Limited v Minister of Public Enterprises 
2016 1 SA 1 (GP), where SAA's shareholder and SAA were accused of 
uncompetitive behaviour after the shareholder provided SAA with a R5 billion 
guarantee due to its poor financial position.  
69  Maqutu Financial Mail.  
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appointees deployed from the ranks of political parties in an insidious 
system of political patronage.70  
b) The SAA board's implication in tender irregularities suggests that the 
established governance principle of delegation of power by the board 
to the executive management has not been properly followed. 
Although the board is supposed to govern the corporation by 
delegating the responsibility of managing the day-to-day affairs to the 
executive management, SAA's board, or at least some of its members, 
has been implicated in meddling in day-to-day business matters such 
as tenders. This not only violates the principle of power delegation, but 
also raises the important corporate governance issue of ethics and 
integrity.  
c) That the corporation developed eight turnaround strategies within six 
years but implemented none shows that the board has failed in its 
primary duty of providing strategic guidance and monitoring. It may 
also be argued that the board failed to discharge both its fiduciary duty 
and the duty of care, skill and diligence towards SAA.  
d) The reported board infighting points to an internal governance problem 
of poor leadership, which results in board instability – this in spite of 
board stability's being a sine quo non for any corporation's corporate 
governance and good performance.  
e) Finally, sound corporate governance at SAA is further impeded by the 
high board and CEO turnover. In terms of King III and the Protocol, the 
board should act as the focal point for and custodian of corporate 
governance.71 A high turnover means that, at any given time, the board 
and executive management lack the stability, continuity and 
institutional memory to resolve the complex governance issues 
confronting the organisation.  
3.2  South African Broadcasting Corporation 
Under the previous dispensation, the SABC was a strategic SOC due to its 
role as a government mouthpiece. With the dawn of democracy, the 
mandate of the corporation had to be extended to include the values of the 
                                            
70  A similar view is held by Howard and Seith-Purdie 2005 Aust J Publ Adm 56-68 
commenting on governance issues in Australian public entities. 
71  IoDSA King Report III Principle 2.1. 
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new Constitution, which resulted in the "public broadcaster" mandate.72 This 
mandate prevents the corporation from being used as a mouthpiece for a 
particular political party or section of society. Instead, it has to serve the 
entire nation in an open and transparent manner. Yet, since the business of 
news and the modes of relaying information are of particular importance to 
politicians, with the media often shaping a society's political outlook, the 
SABC has been exposed to considerable political intrusion from across the 
political spectrum. Controversy surrounding board and executive 
appointments and removal, executive remuneration, content and editorial 
policy as well as tenders, to mention only a few issues, has plagued the 
broadcaster in recent times. 
Like other SOCs, the SABC has had an unhealthy turnover of both board 
and executive management members, having at times experienced a mass 
exodus as a result of resignations or dismissals. The broadcaster has also 
financially underperformed and failed to meet key targets – a fact that 
becomes glaringly obvious from its reported loss of some R395 million 
according to 2014/15 financial statements. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the 
corporation still managed to secure the resources to boost its embattled 
COO's salary with nearly R1 million.73  
Irregular SABC appointments of seemingly unqualified top executives 
abound. A prime example is the scandalous issue involving the 
qualifications of the former board chairperson of the public broadcaster, 
which, it emerged in an inquiry by the parliamentary oversight committee on 
communications, had been falsified.74 In investigating the issue of the now 
former COO's qualifications, the former Public Protector produced a 
damning report disturbingly titled When Governance and Ethics Fail, in 
which she made the following startling findings on the general state of 
corporate governance at the SABC: 
All the above findings are symptomatic of pathological corporate governance 
deficiencies at the SABC, including failure by the SABC Board to provide 
strategic oversight to the National Broadcaster as provided for in the SABC 
Board Charter and King III Report. The Executive Directors (principally the 
GCEO, COO and CFO) failed to provide the necessary support, information 
and guidance to help the Board discharge its fiduciary responsibilities 
effectively and that, by his own admission Mr Motsoeneng caused the Board 
to make irregular and unlawful decisions. The Board was dysfunctional and 
on its watch, allowed Dr Ngubane to effectively perform the function of an 
Executive Chairperson by authorizing numerous salary increments for Mr 
                                            
72  See s 2 of Broadcasting Act 44 of 1999, as amended. 
73  SABC 2015 http://www.sabc.co.za/sabc/annual-reports. 
74  Makinana 2014 Mail & Guardian. 
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Motsoeneng. Mr Motsoeneng has been allowed by successive Boards to 
operate above the law, undermining the GCEO among others, and causing 
the staff, particularly in the Human Resources and Financial Departments to 
engage in unlawful conduct.75 
In a further shocking development, the shareholder minister amended the 
memorandum of incorporation of the SABC, putting herself in charge of the 
appointment, suspension and dismissal of the CEO, COO and CFO.76 She 
then went on to introduce the Broadcasting Amendment Bill, which if 
passed, will bestow upon her the power to directly recommend names of 
board candidates to the president for appointment, thereby removing the 
process from the purview of the National Assembly.77  
These developments point to very specific internal and external corporate 
governance issues at the SABC: 
a) King III, the Companies Act and the Protocol on Corporate 
Governance in the Public Sector emphatically place the governance 
and management of all SOCs in their respective boards' hands. The 
recent move by the SABC shareholder to amend the memorandum of 
incorporation, arrogating to itself the power to directly appoint 
executives, is a clear usurpation of the board's powers. It may be 
argued that the usurpation is legal, as it is done by an amendment of 
the memorandum of incorporation, which the shareholder minister is 
entitled to do.78 However, although probably legal, it is to the detriment 
of corporate governance, as it renders the board redundant and 
weakens it in relation to executive management. After all, one of the 
key functions of the board is executive appointments, performance 
monitoring and succession planning. Arrogation of this power by the 
shareholder minister clearly encroaches on the domain of the board, 
which King III forbids.  
b) From the perspective of the agency theory, the board's sanction of 
exorbitant executive remuneration despite the broadcaster's reported 
loss of R395 million in the 2014/15 financial year is a sign of 
mismanagement and borders on a breach of both the fiduciary duties 
and the duty of skill, care and diligence that the board owes to the 
                                            
75  Office of the Public Protector 2014 http://www.pprotect.org/sites/ 
default/files/Legislation_report/SABC%20FINAL%20REPORT%2017%20FEBRUA
RY%202014.pdf 20.  
76  Gqirana 2015 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sabc-take-over-uncon 
stitutional-da-20151206. 
77  Broadcasting Amendment Bill B39 of 2015. 
78  Section 16 of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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corporation. It also casts doubt on whether the board is fulfilling its 
stewardship role as diligently as it should. 
c) The Public Protector's report tellingly indicates that the SABC 
executive directors failed to provide the non-executive directors with 
the necessary information about the workings of the corporation. One 
of the reasons why King III and other corporate governance codes 
recommend a mix of executive and non-executive directors on boards 
is precisely because the latter may not have all the information 
required to make informed decisions in the corporation's interest.79 
Thus, where executive directors fail to provide such information, they 
fail in their fiduciary duty towards the corporation. 
d) In casting a vote of no confidence against one of its members in 2015, 
the SABC board cited  
… fraudulent conduct, raising matters of the board externally without a 
mandate and non-disclosure of conflict of interest.80  
This further attests to the poor calibre of some of the board members; 
that they are unable to uphold corporate ethics and integrity, which are 
key corporate governance principles. 
e) The power-plays at the SABC are not beneficial for corporate 
governance. Corporate hierarchy puts the board at the helm of the 
company, with executive management answerable to it. The 
shareholder's steadfast and very public support of embattled executive 
managers compromises the board, making it hard for the board to take 
decisive action against such managers, whom the shareholder openly 
prefers. This makes for a weak board, which will most likely fail to be 
a focal point for corporate governance as recommended by King III. A 
more appropriate approach would be for the shareholder to have 
confidence in the board and maintain an arm's-length relationship with 
the corporation. In any event, if, in the shareholder's view, such a 
board fails the corporation, the shareholder does have the power to 
remove the board.81  
                                            
79  See Clarke 2007 Del J Corp L 76; Eric et al 2007 Del J Corp L. 
80  SAPA 2015 https://businesstech.co.za/news/media/82433/sabc-board-gives-non-
executive-director-the-boot. 
81  The shareholder's power to remove directors derives from s 71(1) of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008. 
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f) In the final instance, the issue involving the former board chairperson's 
falsified qualifications directly affects corporate governance: A board 
chairperson fulfils the important function of ensuring that the board 
truly becomes a focal point for corporate governance. The chairperson 
has to take the lead in the corporation's strategic thinking and 
direction, and provide counsel to the CEO.82 If, however, such a chair 
is a person of questionable character who falsifies his or her 
qualifications, it follows that neither the board members nor executive 
management will have confidence in the chair, which lack will in turn 
compromise the functioning of the board as a coherent whole. Lacking 
a solid foundation of ethics and integrity, the corporation will suffer on 
the corporate governance front. Of course, the more recent 
controversy surrounding the now former COO's qualifications did not 
put corporate governance at the SABC in a positive light either.  
3.3  Eskom 
This state-owned utility generates about 95% of South Africa's electricity. 
Yet its ability and capacity to continue providing the country with an 
uninterrupted power supply was recently questioned when the country 
experienced prolonged periods of load-shedding due inter alia to many 
years of maintenance neglect and a lack of the expansion needed to keep 
up with the rapid development of the national economy. After 1994 many 
black homes and informal settlements were electrified, but the utility failed 
to expand its power stations accordingly to keep up with the increased 
demand. In addition, the new power stations Medupi and Kusile were 
supposed to have both joined the grid in 2014, but as at the beginning of 
2017 only one unit of Medupi had gone live. Their delay in joining the grid, 
along with the inadequate investment in distribution maintenance and 
refurbishment over time, ultimately saw the country experiencing rolling 
blackouts, particularly in 2014 and 2015. This has inevitably raised 
questions as to whether the board of Eskom has over the years served the 
company with skill, care and diligence. 
All things considered, though, Eskom's woes go beyond its (in)ability to keep 
South Africans' lights on. The challenges the SOC has encountered are also 
inextricably linked to its weakened ability to raise the necessary capital for 
more power stations after questionable corporate governance practices had 
seen the utility receive negative credit ratings. In particular, Standard & 
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Poor's indicated that the questionable suspension of the company's CEO 
and three senior executives by the board in early 2015 
… led … [the credit-rating agency] to have less confidence in the company's 
corporate governance arrangements as well as in its stand-alone credit 
profile.83  
Consequently, Eskom has had to secure loan guarantees from its 
shareholder, namely government. 
Not only did the Eskom board fire senior executives under questionable 
circumstances, but the shareholder has also chopped and changed the 
board every time a new minister of public enterprises is appointed.84 In 
addition, the Eskom board has been implicated in meddling in the utility's 
day-to-day affairs, a case in point being that of the former chairman, who 
was accused of placing orders and making contractual commitments on 
Eskom's behalf.85 Also, despite being a national utility with multiple 
stakeholders, Eskom has often faltered in its integrated reporting duties as 
required by King III.  
Again, as with SAA and the SABC, the gloomy picture painted above 
presents a number of corporate governance challenges at Eskom:  
a) In recent times, the Eskom board seems to have lost sight of the 
cardinal corporate governance rule of maintaining a distinction 
between management and governance. Undeniably, the board is 
legally charged with the responsibility of running the corporation – this 
much is found in the Companies Act and is embraced by both King III 
and the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector.86 
However, the board is supposed to govern the corporation by 
delegating day-to-day management responsibilities to the executive 
management, and monitoring that these responsibilities are 
discharged as per the strategic direction provided by the board. It is 
therefore unheard of for the board chairperson, particularly a non-
                                            
83  Standard & Poor's 2015 https://www.biznews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/ESKOM-19-Mar-15.pdf; SAPA 2015 
https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/energy/2015-03-19-sampp-
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85  Joffe 2015 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2015-03-25-sa-
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86  Section 66(1)(2) of Companies Act 71 of 2008; Department of Public Enterprises 
Protocol on Corporate Governance para 5.1.1.1. 
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executive chairperson, to conclude contracts on behalf of the 
corporation without executive management's knowledge. 
b) Regular changes in shareholder ministers, board members and senior 
executives rob the corporation of the skill, competencies and 
institutional memory needed to implement long-term projects, 
particularly in a corporation such as Eskom that is involved in the 
complex business of electricity generation. This high turnover at all 
critical levels of the corporation is indeed problematic. King III also 
specifically requires the board to evaluate the CEO's performance and 
ensure a succession plan for the CEO and senior executives. At 
Eskom, however, the CEO was dismissed in March 2015 after serving 
only six months in the position, along with another three top 
executives. Clearly, this does not augur well for the corporation's long-
term stability. In fact, it can be argued that the board's actions created 
further instability and uncertainty within the corporation, as it failed to 
manage succession within the executive team.  
c) Eskom's failure over a 20-year period to constantly increase capacity 
to keep pace with demand, and its failure to monitor and ensure that 
key projects such as Medupi and Kusile are completed on time, bring 
into question whether the utility's board has discharged its primary duty 
of acting with care, skill and diligence. This, in turn, casts doubt on the 
board's composition. Over time, as shareholder ministers come and 
go, they are likely to have appointed directors lacking the necessary 
skill, commercial experience and acumen to govern a utility as large 
and complex as Eskom, which may have compromised corporate 
governance. 
d) King III urges boards to appreciate the effect of stakeholder 
perceptions on reputation, and thus cautions them to manage 
reputation risk.87 In the case of Eskom, the board failed to acknowledge 
this when it chose to suspend the CEO and three other senior 
executives at once, eliciting a negative credit rating from Standard & 
Poor's and hampering the utility in its efforts to raise capital in the 
financial markets. It may be argued that the board's approach to the 
matter was rather reckless and exposed the utility to negative 
stakeholder perceptions and risk.  
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4 Identifying key corporate governance hurdles in SOCs, 
and recommending possible ways to overcome them 
The general thrust of the examination of specific corporate governance 
issues in the three selected SOCs above is twofold.  
On the one hand, many of the corporate governance challenges 
experienced by SOCs may be ascribed to a lack of appreciation by SOC 
boards of the cardinal corporate governance rules, particularly the 
distinction between management and governance, and the principle of 
board delegation. This is compounded by a general disdain for corporate 
ethics and integrity. Corporate governance is bound to fail when board 
members are implicated in scandals relating to tenders and fake 
qualifications. A board that allows management to develop eight turnaround 
strategies in six years at a very high cost, but implements none, as was the 
case with SAA, has clearly failed in its primary responsibility of acting as a 
fiduciary for the corporation and discharging its duty of care, skill and 
diligence. Similarly, an SOC board that has failed to provide strategic 
direction to management over a period of 20 years, resulting in the 
corporation's having to be frequently bailed out and failing to deliver the 
public goods on which society relies, has neglected its duty of being the 
driver of strategy for the corporation. There is therefore consensus that the 
basics of corporate governance are suspect in many South African SOCs.  
Importantly, however, on the other hand, it would also seem that at the heart 
of many challenges facing SOCs is the role of government as a single or 
dominant shareholder, with political interference in the running of SOCs 
appearing to be substantial. Political interference in terms of executive 
managers' appointments, suspensions and dismissals goes against the 
established rule of the division of power between the board and the 
shareholder. The result, as has been the case in other countries also, is that 
executives appointed directly by the shareholder undermine the board, for 
they have an intimate connection with the ultimate corporate authority, 
namely the shareholder.88 If the board can at any point be undermined by 
those who are supposed to be its delegates, it cannot be the focal point of 
corporate governance as recommended by King III. In the same vein, a 
brazen move by government as a dominant shareholder to amend an SOC's 
memorandum of incorporation so as to arrogate the power to appoint, 
suspend and dismiss executives, thus bypassing the board, is ill-conceived. 
It weakens the board and renders it a rubber stamp, which flies in the face 
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of the Companies Act, King III and the Protocol, all of which regard the board 
as the primary body charged with running the corporation, appointing 
executives and mapping their succession.  
It may of course be plausible to argue that government merely "intervenes" 
as opposed to "interferes" in SOCs' affairs, as there is a lot at stake for the 
country, and that the SOCs cannot simply "be left to collapse" while 
government remains oblivious, unconcerned and apathetic. Yet this 
argument in itself would reveal that government makes questionable board 
appointments in the first place if SOCs are being "run into the ground" to an 
extent that necessitates shareholder intervention. It would therefore appear 
that the shareholder intervention argument does not hold water, and that, 
judging by the detailed assessment in paragraph 3, it is in most instances a 
clear case of shareholder interference, which brings both agency and 
political costs. 
It is therefore only logical that the seemingly dual problem hampering sound 
SOC corporate governance requires a dual solution. In order to arrest the 
problem of poor corporate governance in SOCs, government as 
shareholder should firstly appoint fit and proper directors, having followed a 
sound due-diligence process. Having professional boards composed of 
highly skilled individuals with actual experience and acumen to run complex 
business operations is at the heart of the solution to improve SOC 
performance in South Africa, and should be non-negotiable.  
5 Conclusion 
In his 2016 State of the Nation address, President Jacob Zuma 
acknowledged the challenges facing the country's SOCs. Indeed, the 
Presidency, the National Assembly, business, civil society and ordinary 
citizens have over the years observed SOCs deteriorate.  
From a theoretical perspective, this is chiefly attributable to a double dose 
of agency problems. SOCs are run by directors and managers who do not 
own the corporations, which causes a divergence of interests between the 
directors and the shareholders. At the same time, shareholder ministers 
also do not own the corporations, with the real owners of SOCs being the 
public. Neither of these parties can therefore be expected to watch over the 
interests of the SOC with the same vigilance as they would exercise over 
their own. Compounding this double agency problem is the free rider 
challenge – the fact that citizens generally do not have the know-how and 
institutional capacity required to monitor the performance of the shareholder 
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ministers and the directors. The shocking and debilitating corporate 
governance issues resulting from this precarious state of affairs have been 
alluded to in detail in this contribution. 
South Africa cannot afford to continue subsidising underperforming SOCs. 
The country needs to put measures in place to ensure optimal performance 
of its SOCs so that they can contribute not only to better service delivery but 
also to the national economy. It is hoped that the proposals made here may 
be of value to advancing the debate and restoring good governance in 
South Africa's SOCs.  
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